Buchan, J. Asian Affairs. Volume 44, Issue 3. Corboz, E. Die Welt des Islams. Volume 55, Issue 2. Cronin, S. Volume 36, No. Dabashi, H. Fischer, M. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution. Foran, J. Critical Sociology. Volume 19, Issue 2. Gholizadeh, S. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology. Volume 22, No. Greason, D. Economy and Society. Volume 34, Issue 1. Hussain, A. Kamali, M. Citizenship Studies. Volume 1, Issue 2. Katouzian, H.
Volume 47, Issue 5. Keddie, N. Theory and Society. Volume 11, No. Kurzman, C. Volume 28, No. Social Science History. Volume 27, No. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Mahdavi, M. Studies in Religion. Volume 43, Issue 1. Mather, D. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory. Volume 30, Issue 1. Mazaheri, N. Volume 39, No.
Moazami, B. Volume 29, No. Volume 31, Number 1. Moghadam, V. Moshiri, F. Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century. Westview Press: Boulder, CO. Parsa, M. Volume 31, No. Asian Politics and Policy. Volume 5, No. Rahnema, S. Rasler, K. American Sociological Review. Volume 61, Issue 1. Saffari, S. Contemporary Islam. Volume 11, Issue 3.
Seeberg, P. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 41, Issue 4. Skocpol, T. Sohrabi, N. History Compass. Volume 16, Issue Before you download your free e-book, please consider donating to support open access publishing. E-IR is an independent non-profit publisher run by an all volunteer team. In other words, soft power is the power of attractive ideas, capable of persuading people to act in a certain way.
Initially, soft power was the influence one government exercises over another to try to achieve its goals. Over time, however, Nye accepts the plausibility of a non-state actor having soft power. For example, commenting on Hezbollah's war with Israel in early , Nye makes it plain that the concept of soft power can include non-state cultural and religious actors who seek to influence policy by encouraging policymakers to incorporate into their policies religious beliefs, norms and values.
For example,. Israel used its hard military power in a manner that bolstered Hezbollah's soft power and legitimacy in Arab eyes, including many Sunnis who were originally skeptical of a Shi'ite organization with ties to non-Arab Iran.
We know that terrorist organizations most often lose popular support by their own excesses — witness the drop among Jordanians in the soft power of Al Qaeda in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, after the organization bombed a wedding in an Amman hotel Nye, NYE, J. Nye Jr. In sum, whatever their objectives, transnational religious actors aim to spread influence by establishment and development of cross-border networks.
They must seek to use soft power because such actors very rarely have any hard power worth speaking of. Extending the sue of the term soft power in this way allows us to include transnational religious actors, such as the Roman Catholic Church and al Qaeda, who have sought to apply soft power, aiming to encourage significant religious and political changes in, for example, Poland or Saudi Arabia.
Most discussions of Islamic transnational religious actors focus on Sunni extremist groups, notably transnational jihadi organisations such as al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba. Relatively little has been written on transnational Shia groups, active not only in the Middle East but also Europe and elsewhere. Mapping the global Muslim population: a report on the size and distribution of the world's Muslim population. Washington, D. The largest Shia group is mainstream Twelver Shiism.
Transnational shia politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf. London: C. Hurst and Co, For some, Shiism in the Middle East is almost a synonym for Iranian interests. This perception is clear in the continuing debate about where exactly Shia loyalties lie: in the transnational religious community or with the nation-state.
Shiite crescent: a new international or a series of nationalisms? Soon after, Egypt's then president, Hosni Mubarak, went further. When the shiites rise. Foreign Affairs, v. Nasr contends that the Shia victory in the Iraqi general election served to remobilise the region's Shia, in pursuit of common demands and identity claims, which in turn would serve Iranian foreign policy interests.
In sum, the thread connecting the claims of Abdullah, Mubarak and Nasr is their shared concern that Shia transnational networks will work towards goals connected to the foreign policy interests of Iran, which threatens the stability and security of the entire region. Human security report war and peace in the 21st Century. In these view, Iran has clear ambitions of regional hegemony, although it lacks the hard power to achieve its goals.
Instead, Iran's government seeks to exploit its religious soft power to develop multifaceted —cultural, spiritual, religious, economic and political— ties with Shia populations and movements throughout the region, including in Iraq. Others maintain, however, that this is a simplistic, one-sided assessment which overlooks the very significant power of national feeling and nationalism among regional states and Shia populations. For example, Iraqi nationalism is likely to prove more than a match for the transnational solidarities of Shiism, when it comes to Iran's foreign policy goals in Iraq.
Put another way, it seems inherently unlikely that presumed inter-Shia solidarity would be powerful enough to transcend the basic historical enmity and suspicion which traditionally separates Iraqi Arabs and Iranian Persians. It is worth recalling that little more than two decades ago, Iraqi Shia fought their Iranian counterparts in the bloodiest conflict of the second half of the 20th century: the Iran-Iraq war of — In this confrontation an estimated half million soldiers from each side were killed.
How likely then that just a few years later, Shia Iraqis, even those who lived in exile in Iran during the years of Saddam's rule, would welcome with open arms Iran's growing influence in their country? One way of clarifying this issue is to focus on how Shia religious actors in Iran seek to influence Shia actors in other regional countries, including not only Iraq but also Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; each country has significant Shia minorities see Table 1.
They managed to penetrate local societies by espousing the networks of Shiite clergymen. But that was not the end of the matter: instead of accepting leadership and orientation from outside, what happened was that both factional quarrels and the Iranian revolution of helped to mould the landscape of Shiite Islamic activism in the Gulf monarchies.
The reshaping of geopolitics after the Gulf War and the fall of Saddam Hussein in April had a profound impact on transnational Shiite networks. New political opportunities encouraged these groups to concentrate on national issues, such as becoming fierce opponents of the Saudi monarchy.
Yet the question still remains: How deeply have these new beliefs taken root in Islamic society? Are Shiites Saudi or Kuwaiti patriots of the countries? There is also fear that Iran is able to project its soft power in such a way as to help undermine regional political stability. The Sunni Saudi regime fears Shia Iran's capacity to use religious symbols to undermine its legitimacy and facilitate collective political action, especially among Saudi Arabia's already disaffected Shia minority.
Iraq's diverse shia. Le Monde Diplomatique, Sept. How then to understand Iranian-based Shia transnational actors active in Iraq and elsewhere in the Gulf region? Does Shia transnational non-state soft power work with or independently of Iranian state hard power? Or, is the fact of Iraqi-Iranian suspicions and hostilities most significant in denying Iran's goals in Iraq? The conclusion we shall draw is that, despite the undoubted existence of non-state Shia transnational religious networks, such organisations do not manage to undermine or refocus popular loyalties away from national allegiances in favour of undeniably attractive yet somewhat abstract and fuzzy notion of transnational religious identity and associated goals.
A central development in the perceptions of Iran's new powerful position in the region is the post emergence of Iraq's Shia-dominated regime. How do Arab incumbent regimes, the great majority of which have Sunni Islam as the majority religion, manage what they perceive as an ideological threat from Iran, a country which is happy to work with minority Shia groups to help it achieve its regional foreign policy objectives?
Confusingly, however, Fox lists Bahrain as having as its majority religion, Sunni Islam. Table 1 indicates the approximate percentage of Shia Muslims in 13 Middle Eastern countries.
Iran's regional significance has its foundations in a mix of hard and soft power. In relation to the later, the government of Iran seeks to exploit transnational Shia religious links to build its influence.
Iran's Shia diplomacy focuses on Shia movements that either hold quasi-state power, like the Hezbollah in Lebanon, or which have remained shut out of political power completely, as is the case in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In those countries, a transnational network of Shia political activists inspired by the Iranian revolution and schooled in Shia seminaries in Iraq and Iran seeks to mobilise large-scale Shia support for Shia empowerment in the context of long-term Sunni domination Porter, PORTER, Gs.
Iran's regional power rooted in shia ties. This is not to contend that Iran's foreign policy is unique in its bid to exploit real or putative transnational solidarities. Iran's foreign policy and US-Iranian relations: a summary of remarks by Dr. Post-revolution Iran has sought to use religion to pursue material state interests — as a way of contending with neighbouring regimes or trying to force changes in their policies.
For example, it has long promoted Islamist radicals and anti-regime movements — such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Iran's government appears to understand the value of soft and hard power working together to achieve optimum foreign policy outcomes. The document set out the country's strategic economic, political, social and cultural directions over the next 20 years.
The preamble promised that by , i. Iran's year economic perspective: promises and pitfalls. Middle East Policy Council Journal, v. Achieving these goals would require smart power: combined exercise of both hard and soft power. Yet, Iran's hard power is limited; on the other hand, the country potentially has considerable soft power. What might be the sources of Iran's soft power? Soft power and its implications on Iran.
Since the overthrow of Saddam in March , Iran has sought to use both hard and soft power, including cultural, religious, political, and economic influences, to pursue national interests in Iraq.
As Table 1 notes, Iraq is demographically a predominantly Shia majority country. However, under Saddam Hussein's rule, the state privileged the Sunni minority, dealing consistently harshly with the Shia majority. During the immediate post-Saddam years, —, Iran actively supported the position of the United States in supporting elections in Iraq.
Iran hoped to use its cultural and religious soft power in Iraq to try to increase its influence by virtue of its position among Iraq's Shiite majority and, as a result, achieve an influential position. Policy Analysis Fikra Forum. Jan 15, Also available in Arabic. About the Authors. Munqith Dagher. Brief Analysis. To top. The Harrowing of Mustafa Kadhimi. The Future of Putin's War in Syria.
0コメント